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personality variables tend to be present in clusters (people are often anxious,
insecure, and hypersuggestible, for instance), and many subjects of religious
experience escape all of them; and it is clear that the other types of pathological factors (e.g., hallucinogens), whose presence is much easier to detect,
are absent from the vast majority of cases of religious experience (p. 223).

In other words, the clustering effect limits the evidential force of there being
many pathological forms of reduction. Nor, second, does she believe the
non-pathological forms of counter-explanation have a cumulative force:
Atheists such as J. L. Mackie admit that no natural history of religious
experience so far developed can adequately account for the phenomenon of
religious experience as a whole. He is confident, however, that in combination they could provide 'an adequate and much more economical naturalistic
alternative' to religious explanations, so that even psychologically sound
religious experiences do not escape the reductionist net. But Mackie offers
no such account himself. Presumably the combined theory would have to be
extremely complex ... However, it would still be difficult to show that this
was a complete account. In fact, most theists would agree with Mackie that
each natural history discussed above 'correctly identifies factors which have
contributed to some extent to religion', but that is far from admitting that
together they constitute a highly probable and complete reductionist account
of religion (p. 230).

Mackie, it is alleged, goes beyond the evidence represented by past reductionist successes in claiming that all religious experiences are vulnerable to
reduction.
This response seems too quick and optimistic, however. Unless one places
a tremendous weight upon the principle of credulity, to claim that religious
experience has "evidential force" for others as well as the experiencer is, in
my view, to incur an obligation to at least show that there is not a "trend" of
successful counter-explanation. Otherwise, such a trend would make it probable that the remaining experiences can be reduced just like the others have
been. That is, successful religious counter-explanations may have a cumulative effect, at least in terms of affecting the plausibility of believing that some
religious experiences will survive reduction. Franks Davis is to be praised
for drawing attention to the complexity of these appraisals; perhaps her book
will serve as a stepping stone to a full response to the cumulative counterexplanation challenge.

Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in Kierkegaardian Faith, by M.
Jamie Ferreira. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991. Pp. 168. $39.95 (cloth).
CAROLINE J. SIMON, Hope College.
Professor M. Jamie Ferreira's Transforming Vision: Imagination and Will in
Kierkegaardian Faith brings an impressive array of resources to bear on the
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question of how best to interpret Kierkegaard's concept of a "leap of faith."
Ferreira cites writers as diverse as Samuel Coleridge, Donald Davidson, Flannery O'Connor and Richard Rorty on topics ranging from philosophy of
religion to metaphor, from romantic love to paradigm shifts, from literary
criticism to irrationality. The result enriches our understanding of
Kierkegaard, faith and conversion. Her work is densely-woven, rich, and
suggestive; this review will, at best, highlight some of the main lines of
argument and important questions raised by Transforming Vision.
As the book's subtitle emphasizes, Professor Ferreira is interested in reassessing the roles of imagination and will in transitions to faith. She is concerned to counter the "deeply held modern prejudice" that Kierkegaard is a
volitionist with regard to faith (p. 147). On the volitionist model of faith, the
potential believer sees himself as having to choose among options which are
all equally 'real' possibilities for belief. He makes "an intentional, purposeful,
deliberate, self-conscious, or reflective 'act of will'" (p. 7) in choosing to
believe one among these options. Choosing is taken to be separable from
appreciating the options and is a "leap" which bridges the gap between
knowing what the options are and appropriating one of them (p. 8). The role
of imagination, on the volitionist account, is "to 'produce candidates for
belief,' after which 'the will decides which to believe'" (p. 10).
Professor Ferreira contrasts the volitionist model with what she argues is
the Kierkegaardian model of faith. On this model, the "leap" of faith is a
passionate, imaginative "revisioning" which is more like a Gestalt or paradigm shift or the act of apprehending a metaphor than a deliberate decision
(pp. 72-81). Preparation for such a transition can be deliberate, but this brings
one to a critical threshold, the crossing of which is not itself a deliberate act.
"We can choose to look for what we cannot choose to see; looking at the
world in a new way cannot be achieved by the same kind of decision which
effects a looking for a new way of seeing" (p. 121). Faith is "an imaginative
gathering, a synthesis and extension by imagination-which effects a reorienting shift of perspective" (p. 105). It involves a surrender (a finding-oneself-engaged) which cannot be directly willed (p. 117) and which is both
active and passive (p. 87). It is free "without being self-consciously intentional and without having an explicit acknowledgement of a variety of options" because it is not necessary or compelled (p. 39). It is also cognitively
efficacious, incorporating elements of both continuity and discontinuity:
The letting go or surrender assumes an imaginative suspension because it is
a paradoxical seeing of what is both not yet there and already there, for
sometimes it is only by putting-together imaginatively what could be there
that we are able to recognize what is in some sense already there .... Moreover, such a shift in perspective arising from imaginative activity-a seeing
things together differently-would be a free, qualitative transition or leap as
much as any deliberate, self-conscious decision would (p. 107).
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Besides an enriched role for the imagination, this model also involves
seeing the will as appetitive reason or rational desire rather than as volition
(p. 154). Choice with regard to worldviews or love-objects just is becoming
decisively interested, rather than being a separable decision to adopt a stance
(p. 127). Decision, on this model, is "a moment of realization, of becoming
'thoroughly aware' of what was already decided" (p. 158).
Ferreira has made a convincing case that the volitionist is mistaken if she
thinks that all leaps of faith are like e.g. the decision to jump (or not) from
the side of a swimming pool which is clearly seen in broad daylight. In
contrast, Ferreira wants us to see what Kierkegaardian faith is more like the
luxuriantly complex scene, set deep in a Puget Sound island's forest, deftly
portrayed at the end of Annie Dillard's recent novel, The Living:
The forest floor was soft and familiar underfoot: the papery, pitchy fir cones
stuck to Hugh's bare feet as they had when he was a boy in Goshen. The
dense welter of trees hid the sky completely. After a long walk, he heard
voices. Will Ruffin called to him, Vinnie called to him, and held the lantern
up to find the fir trunk down which their voices fell. He climbed the tree
one-handed on many rungs, emerged at a high platform and pulled himself
up.
Hugh found a dozen unrecognizable people on the platform, and heard unfamiliar voices .... Hugh held the lantern aloft and saw it illumine the stiff
boughs of trees; he set the lantern down. He stripped to his union suit, and
somebody handed him the heavy, knotted rope .... Before his eyes in every
direction he saw nothing: no pond, no ocean, no forest, sky, nor any horizon,
only unmixed blackness.
'Swing out,' the voices said in the darkness.
'Push from the platform, and when you're all the way out, let go.'
When? he thought. Where?
The heavy rope pulled at him. He carried it to the platform edge. He hitched
up on the knot and launched out. As he swung through the air, trembling, he
saw the blackness give way below, like a parting of clouds, to a deep patch
of stars on the ground. It was the pond, he hoped, the hole in the woods
reflecting the sky. He judged the instant and let go; he flung himself loose
into the stars.·

Ferreira does not herself give such an example, but it contains analogues of
the features of Kierkegaardian faith. Here, the elements of activity and passivity, continuity and discontinuity, community and individuality, pull and
push, concrete actuality and transcendence, seeing, not-quite-seeing, not-yetseeing, and seeing-as intertwine. Ferreira performs the valuable service of
helping us see that many come to faith through an analogously complex
transition.
One goal of Transforming Vision is to argue that Kierkegaard is neither a
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prescriptive nor a descriptive vo1itionist. As a means to this, the book contains
careful textual arguments for the central role of imagination in Kierkegaard's
account of faith. Some of these arguments rest on Ferreira's often repeated
assertion that it is "the distinctive function of imagination to hold elements
in tension" (p. 5, see also pp. 13, 32, 62, 90, 109, 126). Given this assumption,
Ferreira can argue that Kierkegaard implicitly appeals to imagination whenever he discusses paradox, passion or possibility. For example, she argues
that "insofar as the transition to faith is seen in terms of 'passion' as well as
'leap,' the implicit category of paradox-of tension between oppositesqualifies the category of leap by bringing in imaginative activity" (p. 13).
The argument that Kierkegaard himself thought that only imagination can
hold elements in tension appears to be indirect, resting on the Kierkegaardian
pseudonym "Climacus" and its connection with the sixth century author of
The Heavenly Ladder coupled with the ladder's use among medieval theologians as a symbol for imagination, taken as the mediating faculty between
reason and the senses (pp. 11-12). Some may doubt that this will bear the
weight which Ferreira's interpretation puts on it. Even those who are convinced that Kierkegaard thought of imagination as exclusively having this
function may question whether it is wise for us to endorse this view. One
might see this claim and its defense as an unhelpful reversion to faculty
psychology.
However, the value of Ferreira's insightful description of Kierkegaardian
faith does not hinge on this issue; her characterization need not appeal to a
reified "faculty of imagination" or insupportable claims about its "function."
A much more important issue is just how Ferreira sees Kierkegaardian faith
as relevant to volitionism. Her interpretive counterclaim to volitionism appears to be that Kierkegaard is a Kierkegaardian prescriptivist-true faith as
opposed to the "faith" of those in Christendom involves suspension, engagement and a transformative revisioning. It is less clear whether Ferreira is
recommending that we should be descriptive Kierkegaardians or prescriptive
Kierkegaardians. To be a descriptive Kierkegaardian (in the strong sense)
would be to think that no one ever does make the transition to faith in the
way volitionists claim one does. Since Ferreira views her proposal as delineating "an alternative reading of the human activity required in the actual
transition" to faith (p. 145), this may be her view. But supporting this claim
would necessitate careful examination of many conversion stories, preferably
from a wide spectrum of Christian traditions and perhaps others as well
(Ferreira cites less than a handful, p. 105ff).
To be a prescriptive Kierkegaardian would be to think that "true" conversion is never a mere act of volition or that Kierkegaardian conversion is
preferable to volitional conversion. Advocates of such a view would seem to
have two choices when faced with someone whose conversion story takes a
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volitionist line: see such people as misdescribing their own experience or see
their "conversion" as somehow substandard. Either alternative might give one
pause; however, one can hypothesize about Kierkegaardian reasons for such
a claim. For example, one could doubt that 'will power' is ever enough to
engage decisively one's being, arguing that weighing and making a deliberate
choice among equally real options would at best bring one to Christendom,
not to Christianity. Or, one might apply Ferreira's very interesting suggestions
about the role of the understanding and critical appraisal in Kierkegaardian
faith (pp. 129-144) by arguing that volitionist conversion would be irrational
in ways that Kierkegaardian conversion would not. A filling out and evaluation of such lines of argument would be a worthwhile extension of Ferreira's
project.
An alternative would be to take the volitionist and the Kierkegaardian to
be describing two different, but equally valid, modes of conversion (a position
one might call weak Kierkegaardianism or weak volitionism, depending on
one's initial loyalties). After all, God's house has many mansions and the
Spirit "blows where it wills." Perhaps there are leaps and leaps. It may be
that many more conversions are like Dillard's breathtaking description of
Hugh's plunge into a Puget Sound pond than like the more prosaic decision
to jump from the side of a well-illumined swimming pool; we would have
to, as Wittgenstein so often recommends, look and see. But, within the Christian tradition, we should also humbly keep in mind that we see ourselves as
well as others "through a glass darkly."
NOTE
1. Annie Dillard, The Living (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), p. 397.

An Apology for Apologetics, by Paul J. Griffiths. Maryknoll, NY: Orbis
Books, 1991. Pp. xii and 113. $16.95 (paper).

JAMES WETZEL, Colgate University.
This is a polemical book, written to challenge conventional academic wisdom
on the value of religious apologetics. Griffiths would like the university to
remain open to those who would, as scholars, advocate the truth of a particular tradition. His proposal is striking, to put it mildly. Religious advocacy and
scholarly objectivity have not commonly been thought compatible. In the
Western academy, a murky religious pluralism has been the order of the day.
Departments of religion encourage the comparative study of religion, as long
as that remains a descriptive task, but they generally discourage comparative
evaluation. In part this is because individual religious traditions are demanding objects of study, and very few of us are in a position to make substantive

